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The Suits That Counted: The Judicialization of
Presidential Elections
CHARLES ANTHONY SMITH and CHRISTOPHER SHORTELL

ABSTRACT
The litigation resolving the 2000 election received extensive attention, but there was also an
increase in pre-election litigation in 2000, suggesting an increased reliance on courts even
prior to Bush v. Gore. Did this trend of judicialization of presidential elections in the United
States accelerate in 2004? To answer this question, we collect data on pre-election litigation
from 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. Our findings show that the rate of prospective litigation increased dramatically in the 2004 election, even accounting for state and federal electoral reform from 2001-2004. Beyond the increase in raw numbers, we find that the litigation was
distributed strategically based on predicted closeness of the state and the number of electoral
votes at stake. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this development.
INTRODUCTION

After the 2000 presidential election was resolved in George W. Bush's favor, much of the
scholarly attention focused on the legal dimensions of Bush v. Gore and the Court's institutional or public standing (Chemerinsky 2001;
Gibson, Caldeira, and Spence 2003). In the ensuing years, numerous articles and books addressed the decision's implications for the doctrine of equal protection, public support of the
Court, and the political preferences of the jus-
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tices (Banks, Cohen, and Green 2005; Clayton
2002; Hasen 2001, 2004; Levinson 2002; Posner
2001; Sunstein and Epstein 2001). Certainly, the
Court has received substantial criticism for its
involvement in the 2000 election (Gillman 2001;
Balkin 2001; Garrett in Sunstein and Epstein
2001; Mebane 2004). Recently, the scholarly focus has turned to what effect the 2000 presidential election may have on litigation and the
role of the judiciary in future presidential elections (Foley forthcoming 2007; Hasen 2005;
Lowenstein forthcoming 2007; Tokaji 2005).
An expansion of the role of litigation in presidential elections would be consistent with the
broader trend of increased involvement by the
judiciary in spheres formerly reserved to legiSlatures and executives. Judicialization is the
term most commonly used to describe this
shift. This phenomenon has received substantial notice in the academic literature, especially
in the study of comparative politics (Ferejohn
2002; Hirschi 2004; Pildes 2004; Shapiro and
Stone Sweet 2002; Tate and Vallinder 1995). Did
the legal decisions in the 2000 election acceler-
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ate the trend of judicialization of elections in
the United States? In his 2002 article, Ran
HirschI argued that Bush v. Gore is best understood in the context of judicialization because
it increases judicial involvement in the areas of
"political transformation, regime change, and
electoral disputes" (HirschI 2002, 192). Is this
change sustained over time or was the 2000
election an anomaly? What is the effect of the
2000 presidential election on future presidential contests? Did the increase in litigation begin after the 2000 election or was the trend developing prior to that? Is this an example of the
increasing use of "electoral law as political
strategy" (Hasen 2005, 957)?
Our findings below suggest that the effect is
lasting and that political actors use litigation
both more frequently and more strategically
than in the past. Comparative data from the
1992,1996,2000, and 2004 elections allow us to
consider whether parties, candidates, and interest groups have increased their likelihood of
litigating to gain electoral advantage and solve
potential electoral disputes. 1 We attempt to answer this question by comparing the pre-election litigation from the four most recent presidential elections for all fifty states and the
District of Columbia. By considering both the
quantitative and qualitative shifts in litigation
strategy, we demonstrate that pre-election litigation has become an increasingly central part
of the normal presidential election strategy, at
least when a close election is anticipated.
An increase in lawsuits in 2004 was not unexpected, but were the suits widespread and
random or were they narrowly focused in key
competitive areas? We develop a logic of litigation that suggests the parties will litigate in predictable ways driven by electoral strategy. As a
result, litigation is likely to play a far more
prominent role in areas where the election is
prospectively close. Close elections alone are not
sufficient, however. Given the expense of litigation, we would expect to find most suits centered in close races with rich electoral pay-offs.
In other words, Ohio is likely to see far more litigation than either Illinois (low competitiveness)
or New Hampshire (low electoral votes). While
Hasen (2005, 946) points out this incentive structure with regard to post-election litigation, the
logic holds true for pre-election strategies.
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Our analysis is not intended to suggest that
litigation was unimportant to parties historically. Numerous examples of party directed litigation abound, not only in areas such as redistricting, but also in arenas of more extensive
litigation by interest groups such as challenges
to practices like the white primaries. Nor do we
intend to suggest that parties were not previously interested in influencing the "rules of the
game" for elections. Nonetheless, we argue that
the electoral landscape has changed in significant ways since 2000. In particular, there is an
increased emphasis on litigation relating to the
presidential election. Most of the prior litigation related to Congressional, state, and local
issues. In the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections, pre-election litigation was almost non-existent. In 2000, both parties faced a remarkably
close election and there was a consequent increase in the number of pre-election lawsuits
filed. 2004 saw a significant acceleration of this
trend and a dramatic increase in the number of
suits filed.
The difference in the political landscape and
logic after the 2000 election is that the political
players now perceive the judiciary as a venue
of first rather than last recourse. The strategic
political lesson from the 2000 election litigation
is that preventive (pre-election) litigation is a
strategy far more likely to be successful than
restorative (post-election) litigation. That is,
courts are seen as one of the primary arenas for
challenging the rules of the game before the
election. At a minimum, the costs of failing to
anticipate problems before election day are
substantial enough that parties are unlikely to
risk a more passive strategy.2 While the outcome of the 2000 election did not initiate this
trend, as evidenced by the increase in filings
prior to that election, it does appear to have so-

lOur study does not address the further question of
plaintiff success through litigation. The most we can conclude is that Hie conditions necessary for judicialization
are present. However, it is reasonable to assume that rational actors would not continue to file suits if there were
no benefits to be gained from them.
2 Obviously, not all legal challenges can be brought
prospectively. Concerns about standing caused one judge
on the Sixth Circuit to vote to deny an injunction in Summit COllnty Democratic Central & Exeelltive Committee v.
Blackwell, 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004).
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lidified the developing notion among political
actors that the courts are now a critical component of a successful electoral strategy.
In light of the events following the 2000 presidential election, there is significant reason to
believe that courts will be more involved in future electoral disputes. The now-completed
2004 presidential election offers the first opportunity to test whether the trend seen in 2000
is continuing or was an anomaly. We expect to
find a change in the raw number of suits filed,
a shift -in the substance of the suits from local
concerns to those that might alter the presidential election outcome, and an increased involvement of national political actors in the initiation of litigation. We also expect to find that
the lawsuits in 2004 will be used in ways that
are most likely to advance electoral victory,
particularly in battleground states. An absence
of any meaningful difference in these dimensions of litigation from 2000 to 2004 would suggest that the increase of litigation before the
2000 election is not indicative of a developing
pattern. As we will discuss, our findings confirm that litigation as a campaign and electoral
strategy now holds a far more prominent place
for political actors. These findings suggest that
judicialization of presidential elections had begun before the 2000 Florida controversy and
that the Florida controversy accelerated the
pace.

METHODOLOGY
To address the question of whether there was
a change in the election strategy between the
2000 and 2004 presidential elections, we collected data on election-related cases filed in each
state and the District of Columbia in both years.
To test whether any change from 2000 to 2004
was a new development or a continuation of an
earlier trend, we also collected data on electionrela ted cases filed in 1996 and 1992. We used the
calendar year through election-day as our time
parameter.3 In order to generate a comprehensive set of relevant cases, we relied upon a combination of Lexis-Nexis searches and a review of
daily newspaper accounts.4
Of the cases collected, we included only
those filed before the close of election-day.s The
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filing of suits after an election is dependent almost entirely on whether the suits have any
likelihood of changing the outcome of the race.
Where the election-day results are close or
within the "margin of litigation," as in 2000,
there will be more post-election lawsuits
(Hasen 2005, 938). Where the election-day results are not as close, as in 2004, post-election
lawsuits are unlikely. As a result, any differences in the number of lawsuits filed after an
election tell us little about whether relevant
parties are more inclined to use the courts as
part of their election strategy.
In addition, the Court granted certiorari in
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board to
address concerns about trying to change the
rules after the election (531 U.S. 70 [2000]). This
signals to potential litigants that it is better to
file suits before the election rather than after,
and we would expect the relevant parties to respond to this doctrinal message. Additionally,
a post-election strategy puts the litigants in a
position to be framed as sore losers by their opponents. 6 Finally, study of cases filed prior to
elections provides a more complete picture of
the strategic calculations of political parties,

3 It

is possible that some cases were filed the year before,
but it is unlikely that they were a significant number. Any
action filed after the election would be geared towards
restorative justice rather than electoral strategy.
4 The full listing of cases is available at <http://www.
csun.edu/ -cshortell/ electioncasesmatrix.xls>.
LexisNexis provides access to all opinions of state appellate
and supreme courts as well as written opinions from all
federal courts. Search terms included "election," "candidates," and "voting." Data collected from Lexis-Nexis
were supplemented by news accounts of the filing of
cases. Specifically, we collected the case name, the state
the case was filed in, the jurisdiction (state or federal), and
the claim being made by the plaintiff. Where possible, we
also included the outcome of the case, but our data on
that are not comprehensive so we could not use it to draw
any conclusions. Any specific case that may have been
overlooked would be unlikely to alter our findings in any
significant way. For further verification of our 2004 totals,
we compared our dataset to one published by electionline.org, the only other reasonably complete list of cases,
and we had identical or more comprehesive data for all
states. (litigation update, Feb 14, 2005, electionline.org).
5 We also excluded cases during the relevant years that
addressed previous elections or elections that were not
held on the same days as the primary or general elections.
6 Consider the Republican campaign sign parodies of
"Sore/Loserman" in the type, color and design of the
"Gore/Lieberman" signs.
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candidates, and interest groups that can be attained from post-election cases. These actors
would not pe expected to commit scarce resources before an election without a reasonable
belief that the commitment of the resources
would result in some pay-off. For all these reasons, we consider prospective lawsuits, those
filed before an election, to be a reasonable measure of differences in strategy in presidential
elections between 1992 and 2004.
States that are expected to be close should
attract more litigation. States that are expected to be close and also are rich in electoral value should attract the most litigation.
Not only are political parties more focused on
these states, but interest groups are also more
actively mobilized and likely to take action.
Conversely, states that are not close should
have little litigation and states that are not
close and have little electoral value should
have virtually no litigation. While states that
are both closely contested and rich in electoral
votes have always drawn the most attention
from campaigns, pre-election litigation previously has not been an important element of
this attention. If, contrary to our expectations,
election litigation were not viewed strategic~lly before or after 2000, we would expect to
fmd a random distribution of cases across all
states.
We collected summaries of the facts for each
case, including the legal basis of the claims as
pleaded by the parties. We then sorted the cases
into three categories based on subject area. The
first category is Ballot Access. Ballot access includes any case addressing the inclusion of a
candidate, party, or election oriented initiative
on a ballot. For example, there were a number
of challenges alleging that parties or candidates
either failed to comply with qualifying rules or
were being improperly denied a place on a ballot. The second category is Voter Access and
Regi~trati~n. This category includes any case
dealmg WIth the act of voting, including cases
about absentee ballots, pre-election day voter
harassment, felony purge lists, or registration
requirements. Our third and final category is
Ballot Counting. This group of cases includes
challenges to canvassing board standards, ballot design, voting machine technology, and recount procedures?

TABLE 1. TOTAL ELECTION CASES
FILED DURING 1992 CYCLE

State

Cts
Ballot Access
Voter Ace/Reg
Ballot Counting
Total

1
0
0
0

Federal
Cts
0
0
0
0

Total
1
0
0
1

These categories provided a mechanism for
sorting the cases for the purpose of detecting
changes in the substantive nature of the litigation from election to election. We also distinguished between federal and state jurisdiction
in order to assess whether litigants preferred
one forum over the other. These procedures
generated comparable data sets from the 1992,
1996,2000, and 2004 election cycles. Addition~lly,. we sought to account for the wave of legIslahve electoral reform that took place in the
wake of the 2000 elections. All of the 2004 cases
arising from a dispute over new electoral rules
are separately identified and addressed.
We will first consider the quantitative data
from all the states and the District of Columbia, discussing changes over time as well as the
substance of the litigation. We then consider
the data from the "battleground" states. After
,:e examine the data, we consider its implicahons, draw some general conclusions, and
make some suggestions for additional research.
CASES PRIOR TO THE 1992,
1996, AND 2000
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
By collecting data from the 1992, 1996, and
2000 election cycles, we established a baseline
for comparison with events in 2004. We determined the number of suits filed, the jurisdic-

7 Our ~lassifi~at~ons of the cases are, in practice, mutually
exclus1ve. This 1S a reflection of the subject matter of the
cases, rather t~an forcing cases into only one category.
Ballot acce~s SU1ts, for example, dealt exclusively with ballot access 1ssues. and not ~ith ballot counting. This has
~e added benef1t of allowmg us to avoid double-countmg any cases.
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tion of those suits, as well as the substantive issues addressed by each case. By reviewing this
information, we are able to get an overview of
litigation activity prior to these elections. Tables 1,2, and 3 show the numbers and type~ of
action in each of the three election cycles flIed
in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
In both 1992 and 1996, there was only one
pre-election case filed that was relate~ to t~e
presidential election. In 1992, the Wlsconsm
State Supreme Court heard a ballot access case
brought by the ACLU in an effort to secure a
place for ex-Klansman David Duke.on the Republican presidential preference (pnmary) ballot. And in 1996, a federal court dismissed an
action to force New Hampshire to comply fully
with the Motor Voter law. Hasen finds 108 election related lawsuits nationwide in 1996, but all
107 other cases deal with state or Congressional
races (2005, 958).8
These data suggest that while election litigation was going on, the focus was not on the
presidential race. This is particularly striking
for 1992, given the competitiveness of the election and the inclusion of a prominent third
party candidate, Ross Perot. Despite these factors, there was no litigation filed in an attempt
to control ballot access for Perot or to alter voter
access or registration. Lewis-Beck and Squire
suggest that party efforts may have been directed toward legislative efforts to heighten
ballot access requirements such as signaturegathering to keep third party candidates off the
ballot (1995; see also Ansolabehere and Gerber
1996). The absence of Perot-related litigation offers some support for this view 'and suggests
that the two major parties and their supporters
did not consider the courts to be a viable strategic avenue.
The election of 2000 presents a marked contrast. State courts entertained a total of 17 cases
TABLE

2,

TOTAL ELEcnON CASES

FILED DURING

Ballot Access
Voter Acc/Reg
Ballot Counting
Total

1996

CYCLE

State
Cts

Federal
Cts

0
0
0
0

0

TABLE

3.

TOTAL ELEcnON CASES

FILED DURING

Ballot Access
Voter Acc/Reg
Ballot Coun~ing
Total

2000

CYCLE

State
Cts

Federal
Cts

Total

9

15

24

6
2

14
2

20

17

31

48

4

while 31 federal suits were filed for a total of
48 cases across the country. Several states had
multiple suits in 2000. Pennsylvania had the
most with seven cases. New Mexico had the
. second most with five. Michigan, North Car! olina, and Washington each had four cases.
Florida, Illinois, and New York each had three
cases. California, Connecticut, Ohio, and Oregon each had two cases. Seven states .ha~ one
case and thirty-one states and the Dlstnct of
Columbia had no pre-election litigation at all
in 2000. Clearly the anticipated closeness of the
election played a major, although not exclusive,
role in an increased reliance on courts to mediate electoral disputes, even prior to election
day. The pattern is one of increased judici~l
ization of elections over time, though the mcrease in presidential election litigation from
1992 to 2000 is sudden rather than gradual.
The notable jump in ballot access litigation
from 1992 to 2000 is perhaps attributable to retrospective consideration of the 1992 elect~on.
Given the impact of Perot on the 1992 election,
the parties may have worked harder administratively to exclude third party candidates such
as Nader and Buchanan from the ballot, necessitating the move to the courts by their supporters.
Most of the ballot access cases in 2000 involved third parties such as the Green Party or
the Libertarian Party and their candidates.
Connecticut, for example, saw actions to secure
a spot on the ballot by both Pat Buchanan and
Lyndon LaRouche. In Florida, Buchanan a~d
Hagelin litigated over who could clalm
Total ballot access as the Reform Party candidate.
Buchanan sued for inclusion on the Michigan
0

1

1

0

0

1

1

Hasen's database of cases is available at <http://www .
electionlawblog.org/ archives / washleeappendix.xls> .

8
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ballot. Ralph Nader or the Green Party filed
similar suits in Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and West Virginia.
Most of the voter access and registration cases
involved issues such as the right of felons to vote
or the ease with which registration could be accomplished. Litigation in Florida sought to restore felons' rights to vote, although all parties
acknowledged the matter would not be resolved
before the 2000 election. In Georgia, the United
Nuwabian Nation of Moors sought to replace
members of their group that had been purged
from the voting rolls for a variety of different
reasons. A case in Illinois sought to permit late
registration for a group of teenagers whose original registrations were ruled invalid because of
technical deficiencies. A Maryland case sought
to allow college students to register to vote
where they were enrolled rather than at their
home addresses.
The four ballot counting cases were limited
to questions about absentee ballots or the handling of ballots. For instance, the Republican
Party sued in New Mexico to stop a mass mailing of absentee ballots and in Oregon where it
claimed a county failed to secure ballots after
a primary. Our findings strongly suggest that
between 1992 and 2000, a change began to take
place in the role of election litigation. 9 The reasons for this development are not entirely clear,
but are likely related to the broader trends of
~udic~a~ involvement in democratic politics
IdentIfled by scholars such as HirschI and
Pildes (Hirschi 2002; Hirschi 2004; Pildes 2004).
This change, however, was still nascent and did
not involve much participation from the most
prominent and institutionalized political actors
such as the two major parties and their presidential candidates until after the election. The
expanded use of the courts in these three areas
before the election as· well as the post-election
litigation in 2000 paved the way for the more
aggressive participation of these political actors
and a litigation explOSion in 2004.
CASES PRIOR TO THE 2004
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
We used the same method of collection and
categorization for the preSidential election of

TABLE

4.

TOTAL ELEcnON CASES

FILED DURING

Ballot Access
Voter Ace/Reg
Ballot Counting
Total

2004

CYCLE

State
Cts

Federal
Cts

Total

27
24
14
65

14
27
8
49

41

51
22
114

2004 as for the previous elections. Litigation in
2004 leaped beyond the already increased level
found in 2000. Table 4 presents the numbers
and types of actions filed prior to the 2004 election in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
In 2004, state courts entertained a total of 65
cases while 49 federal suits were filed for a total of 114 cases across the country. This is a
137.5 percent increase in litigation over 2000.
While the litigants somewhat favored state
courts over federal courts, both state and federal venues were active locales for litigation.
Parties, candidates, and interest groups availed
themselves of both avenues of judicial involvement. Indeed, given the complex interactions of state and federal election laws, it is not
a surprise that litigants used both venues.
While our data do not allow us to draw firm
conclusions about the presence of forum shopping, it is likely that litigants chose venues
based primarily upon where they believed they
could most likely prevail. These considerations
could include the specific protections afforded
by .state ~r federal laws, the nature of the legal
claImS bemg pursued, or the desire to reach politically sympathetic judges. Regardless, it is
consistent with the mixed federal! state nature
of electoral laws in the United States to find litigation increase in both jurisdictions.
Ballot access litigation emerged as a specific
party strategy in 2004 as the 41 ballot access
cases were almost exclusively efforts to secure
or deny a place on the ballot for Ralph Nader

The absence of a competitive ejection in 1996 may make
the change appear more sudden than it was. Had 1996
been a close election, we might have seen an increase in
election litigation over 1992, although not necessarily to
the degree seen in 2000.
9
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TABLE

5.

NADER CASES,

Suits seeking inclusion of Nader
Suits seeking exclusion of Nader

2000 vs. 2004
2000

2004

5

17

o

11

whether through the Green Party or the Reform
Party. In Arizona, for example, one suit sought
to force Nader's inclusion on the ballot while
one suit sought to force his exclusion from the
ballot. In fact, with the exception of one case in
Kansas that sought an order allowing only Re:publicans to vote in the Republican primary,
one case in Washington seeking to put the Libertarian Party on the ballot, and one case in
Utah seeking to put a different Green Party candidate (Cobb) on the ballot, all of the ballot access cases in 2004 involved Nader. The assumption was that Nader on the ballot would
help Bush and hurt Kerry. The premise underlying this assumption is that some Nader voters would vote for Kerry as an alternative if
Nader was unavailable. The Nader litigation
increased in number and changed in nature
from 2000 to 2004. Table 5 shows the growth in
lawsuits relating to Nader from the 2000 cycle
to the 2004 cycle.
The overt involvement of the Democrats and
the Republicans in the Nader litigation in 2004
increased dramatically. In states such as Colorado and Wisconsin, the local Democratic
Party was the named plaintiff in attempts to exclude Nader from the ballot. While either
Nader or the Green Party would obviously be
the plaintiff in litigation to include him on the
ballot, the Republican Party provided support
for Nader's signature gathering efforts (Stone
2004). That is, in 2000, the litigation had been
driven by a sincere effort by Nader and the
Green Party to secure a spot on the ballot with
little participation in the litigation by outside
parties. The litigation in 2004 was driven by the
strategic efforts of the two major parties to secure or deprive Nader a spot on the ballot (Burden 2005; Burden 2006).
The question whether the presence or absence of Nader on ballots across the country actually changed the outcome of the presidential
election speaks past the scope of this project.
Indeed, given the general animus directed by
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Democrats at Nader after the 2000 election as
well as the diminished vote share by Nader in
2004, his presence or absence may have been
inconsequen tial. lO Still, the concern abou t
Nader on the ballot by both the Democrats and
Republicans inexorably led to the use of preelection litigation to exclude or include him.ll
Moreover, even if the Nader vote was inconsequential in the 2004 presidential vote distribution, given the closeness of the 2000 election
and the vigorous attention paid to Nader by
the parties in 2004, each party is likely to litigate aggressively when any third-party has
some realistic chance of attracting enough
votes to alter a race. If a candidate like Ross
Perot ran today, that candidacy would face numerous litigation challenges to try and keep
him off or put him on the ballot. That is, in future close elections with a competitive third
party, the two major parties will litigate to keep
ideologically close third parties off the ballot
and third parties that are ideologically close to
the opposition on the ballots.
Voter access and registration was also a
heavily litigated area in 2004. A total of 51 cases
sought primarily to expand or restrict the ability of citizens to vote. Many of the cases sought
to repeal the ban on felons voting or simplify
the process for the restoration of civil rights.
For instance, Ohio and Florida saw litigation
aimed at creating an automatic restoration of
felons' rights to vote. Many suits sought to
make the rules for registration or voting more
or less restrictive. In Colorado, for example, an
action was brought to eliminate the requirement that first time voters present photographic idl;!ntification at the polls. An action in

10 For example, according to the Florida Department of
State, Division of Elections, in 2004, Nader received 32,971
votes or .4% of the total presidential vote. In 2000 Nader
received 97,488 votes or 1.6% of the total presidential vote.
<http://election.dos.state.fl. us / elections / resul tsarchive/lndex.asp> .
11 As suggested by the number of suits seeking the inclusion of Nader on the ballot, the efforts by supporters
of Kerry's candidacy included many administrative attempts at exclusion in addition to efforts through the
courts. A more aggressive legal strategy does not mean
that remedies through election boards and secretaries of
state are ignored. To the contrary, lawsuits provide a supplement in an environment where a candidate's supporters are seeking any advantage they can obtain.
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Nevada sought to extend the deadline for registration. Actions in Pennsylvania sought to
prohibit felons from voting absentee an~ to allow additional time for overseas soldIers to
vote. An action in Illinois sought to allow "stayat-horne-moms" to vote by absentee ballot.
Each side sought to shape the pool of voters in
ways that would be most favorable to its preferred.candidate. Generally speaking, supporters of Bush's candidacy tended to file suits over
issues such as false registrations and the opportunity to challenge illegal voters, while supporters of Kerry's candidacy filed suits. attempting to expand the number of pOSSIble
voters through easier registration requirements
and permitting felons to vote.
Given the litigation after the 2000 election regarding how votes would be counted or recounted, it is not surprising that ballot counting suits played an important role in 2004. This
category of suits increased from four in 2000 to
twenty-two in 2004. The 22 ballot counting
suits in 2004 addressed issues arising out of the
switch to electronic voting, provisional ballots,
and technically defective absentee and early
voting ballots. For instance, cases in Ohio
sought to prohibit the use of punch card voting, allow voters to cast provisional ballots in
the event of registration errors, and allow access to paper ballots in precincts where long
lines created lengthy waiting times to cast electronic votes. In Iowa and Florida, among others, suits were filed to force the inclusion of
provisional ballots even if those ballots were
cast in the wrong precincts. Litigation was filed
in Maryland, Florida, and New Jersey seeking
some sort of physical recount capacity where
electronic voting systems left no paper-trail.
The bulk of the ballot counting litigation was
brought by plaintiffs favoring Kerry who
sought to ensure that all ballots in Democratic
strongholds would be counted. Provisional ballots, paper trails, and challenges to electronic
voting were all thought to advance this cause.
A final point to make has to do with the significant increase in litigation brought in their
own names by the two major political parties.
Both parties increased their direct participation
in litigation. Cases where either the Democratic or Republican party was the named plaintiff increased from five in 2000 to eighteen in

TABLE

6.

CASES WITH POLITICAL PARTY AS PLAINTIFF

Democratic Party as Plaintiff
Republican Party as Plaintiff

2000

2004

3

11

2

7

2004. 12 This measure understates the actual role
of the political parties, since they also financially supported some lawsuits by individual
voters and may have directed lawsuits by interest groups. Nonetheless, the change is stark.
The political parties more directly asserted
themselves in the realm of litigation than in
past presidential elections.
THE INFLUENCE OF
ELECTORAL REFORM
The increase to 114 cases related to the presidential election compared to 48 in 2000 and
one each in 1992 and 1996 is undoubtedly substantial. However, the statutory landscape did
not remain the same between 2000 and 2004. In
fact, all 50 states engaged in fairly extensive
electoral reform during the period and Congress passed the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA) in 2002. Both Hasen (2005) and Tokaji
(2005) suggest that electoral reform played a
major role in the increase in litigation. Could
these electoral reforms fully account for the increase in litigation between 2000 and 2004?
In order to answer this question, we identified each of the cases in 2004 that challenged
or was based on a law or policy promulgated
at the state or federal level between 2001 and
2004. For example, HA VA required that states
provide the option of a provisional ballot to
voters at the wrong precinct, so all provisional
ballot cases can be considered electoral reform
cases. Once we identified the cases, we removed them from our case totals as presented
in Table 7.
There were 41 cases in 2004 that arose as a
direct result of electoral reform. Removing

12 These cases include both national and state level political parties.
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TABLE 7. TOTAL NON-ELECfORAL REFORM
CASES FILED DURING 2004 CYCLE

Ballot access
Voter access + reg
Ballot counting
Total

State courts

Federal courts

Total

26
10

13

24

39
24

5
32

73

5

41

10

them from our totals still leaves 73 cases, about
a 50% increase over the 2000 totals. The majority of the remaining cases fell in the category
of ballot access, particularly cases relating to
the inclusion of Ralph Nader on the ballot.
There were still substantial numbers of voter
access and registration cases. The ballot counting cases constitute the smallest portion of the
cases as before. Not surprisingly, these cases
are also a smaller percentage of the total when
the electoral reform cases are left out of account.
This method is obviously not perfect, since
both the electoral reform and the decision to
challenge a new electoral law are in part consequences of the 2000 election. The electoral reform movement certainly brought to light issues that were previously unchallenged and
could have indirectly contributed to the increases seen in litigation in 2004. However, it is
not clear that the election reform movement initiated lawsuits beyond those directly related to
electoral reform. If anything, it is more likely
that the information provided served as a signal to litigants about where to direct their litigation efforts rather than whether to initiate litigation at all. On the other side, it could be
argued that our method is actually overstating
the impact of electoral reform. In every election
some of the litigation is based on new policies.
In 2000, for example, 10 of the 48 cases were
based on policies passed since the 1996 election.
Nonetheless, even under the most conservative
assumptions that all cases based on electoral reform shQuld be excluded, the change between
elections remains dramatic. We can conclude
with a fair degree of confidence that the rise in
litigation between 2000 and 2004 was not driven by electoral reform alone.
Another possible explanation is that litigation increased simply because the 2004 election

was so close. The perceived closeness of the
election is no doubt a major factor. However,
the increase between 2000 and 2004 cannot be
explained solely because 2004 was a close election. 2000 also featured a dramatically close
election. If perceived closeness of election were
the sole factor the electoral reform adjusted
rates of litigation should have been similar between 2000 and 2004. Indeed, on that assumption there should have been more lawsuits in
1992. That there were almost no cases in 1992
and an almost 50% increase between the 2000
and 2004 elections suggests an expected close
election is at most a necessary but not sufficient
condition for a high level of litigation.
We argue that in addition to the closeness of
the election and the increase in electoral reform,
the relevant political actors learned an important lesson in 2000 and applied it in 2004. Preelection litigation can affect the outcome of the
election and dedicating additional resources to
legal battles is a necessary part of a successful
electoral strategy. Courts, rather than potentially partisan electoral boards and secretaries
of state, may offer a more effective means of
preventing abuse of the electoral system by opponents or otherwise gaining an advantage. If
political actors increasingly view litigation as a
strategic tool, then, how does that affect the distribution of cases across states and subjects?
A GRAPHIC COMPARISON OF
2000 AND 2004
We find that the increase in litigation across
the three subject areas was not idiosyncratic or
random. Indeed, the new litigiousness of the
presidential election was demonstrably strategic. An anticipated narrow vote margin in a
state was not sufficient to cause a dramatic increase in litigation. A rich electoral college payoff was also insufficient to attract litigation resources before the election. However, a close
race in an electorally rich state provided the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the parties, candidates, and interest groups to commit
to litigation.
We plotted the data in a three dimensional
representation in order to show that states with
a close vote spread and relatively rich electoral
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value saw the greatest increase in litigation. In
Fig. 1 (2000) and Fig. 2 (2004), each state and
the District of Columbia are represented by the
circles. The Vote Spread, the percentile difference between the two major candidates, is plotted on the Y axis (the axis on the far left of the
diagram) while the electoral value, the number
of Electoral Votes, is plotted on the X axis (the
horizontal axis on the diagram). The number of
Lawsuits is plotted on the Z axis. The Z axis illustrates through the loft (or height) the volume of lawsuits. For ease of interpretation,
grayscale bands have been employed to illustrate the number of lawsuits. Each band represents one lawsuit. In representing the data,
each figure uses the same dimensional scale,
orientation, grayscale, contrast, and lighting.
Selected states are labeled for ease of comparison.
The first observation to be gleaned from the
charts is that litigation dramatically increased
from the 2000 election to the 2004 election. Fur-

ther, because we would expect those states
with both close elections and rich electoral values (close/rich states) to have more litigation,
we would expect those portions of the "blanket" of the three dimensional representation to
be more peaked. A comparison of Figure 1
(2000) with Figure 2 (2004) shows an expansion
of litigation not only across the board, but more
dramatically in those close/rich states. Accordingly, we can conclude that since the
close/rich states did indeed attract more litigation, the litigation was strategically driven.
A comparison of the charts shows that noncompetitive states such as California and Texas
showed little movement in litigation rates despite rich electoral values. States with little electoral value, such as New Hampshire, also
showed little change in litigant activity despite
relatively close elections. As expected, states
like Florida, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, all rich in
electoral votes with competitive elections, drew
dramatic increases in the volume of litigation
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FIG. 1. (2000) Number of Lawsuit as a Function of Victory Margin and Electoral Value 2000 Election.
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brought by the parties, candidates, and interest groups. While Florida and Ohio obviously
drew the largest amount of litigation, as two of
the most competitive states, those two state.s
alone do not account for the increase. Removing all of the lawsuits from Florida and Ohio
from our analysis still leaves 74 lawsuits filed
in 2004, compared with 48 in 2000. Consistent
with our argument, the 74 remaining lawsuits
are still arrayed strategically, with half of them
being filed in the nine other battleground
states.
To determine whether we were capturing
something other than a random distribution of
litigation across the states, we ran a negative
binomial regression using vote spread (Spread)
and electoral votes (Electoral Votes) as independent variables with the number of lawsuits as
the dependent variable (Lawsuits)P The vote
spread is the percentile difference between the
vote share of the two major parties. The electoral votes are the designated electoral votes

each state may cast in the electoral college. As
shown in Table 8, both Spread (z = -4.40) and
Electoral Votes (z = 4.15) are highly significant
in the expected directions. That is, the closer
the race and the greater the electoral value, the
more likely litigation will happen. These directionally significant results are what we
would expect if the litigation was strategicthat is, resources were utilized where the payoff could be maximized rather than in a random or idiosyncratic manner. The year (2004)

We first ran a Poisson regression because like many incidents of counting events, the data follow a Poisson distribution. That is, the distribution is skewed, non-negative,
and the variance likely increases as the mean increases. The
Poisson model also assumes an equality of mean and variance. However, testing the Poisson regression, the large
value of the Pearson Chi-sq (goodness of fit chi-sq was
277.34) indicated over-dispersion. Although the statistical
and substantive results are virtually identical, we present
the results of the negative binomial regression in the text
in order to account for over-dispersion.

13
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TABLE 8. NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF
LmGATlON, VOTE SPREAD AND ELECTORAL VOTES

Lawsuits
Spread
Electoral votes
Year dummy
Constant

Coe!

Std. Err.

z

-0.0691631
0.0615946
0.8596208
-0.2007113

0.016
0.015
0.270
0.337

-4.40
4.15
3.18
-0.60

Number of obs = 102
LR chi2(3) = 50.35
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Log likelihood = -143.57833
Liklihood-ratio test of alpha
Prob > = chibar2 = 0.000

p>1 zl
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.552

venue. Given the wide range and variety of avenues for litigation that can alter the rules for
elections, it seems highly probable that in the
future, major political parties and interest
groups will develop litigation strategies well
before close elections.
IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
ADDITIONAL RESEARCH

=

0: chibar2(01)

=

59.63

From the results of our study, it seems clear
that the role of litigation in 2000 was not an
anomaly. Indeed, it was a precursor of an increased use of electoral law as political strategy
in 2004. Even accounting for the intervening
electoral reform legislation, the increase in the
rate of litigation was substantial. Pre-election
litigation has, therefore, assumed a far more
prominent role in the election strategy of all political actors, at least when a close election is
anticipated. While our findings must be situated in the larger context of increased judicialization over time, we argue that 2004 may have
represented a critical tipping point in the process. Given the current competitive electoral
landscape, there is no reason to anticipate a decline in litigation in the near future Gacobson
2003).
We can also conclude that the parties will litigate in predictable strategic ways. Rather than
merely filing suits wherever a potential problem may arise, they will dedicate litigation resources to states where cases are likely to have
the greatest impact on the outcome of the election.
The events following the 2000 preSidential
election appear to have caused a number of
changes in how the relevant political actors
proceeded in 2004. There is no question that political actors in 2000 were willing to engage in
litigation at a significantly higher rate than in
previous recent elections. Arguably this is a result of the anticipated closeness of the election,
although it is also likely a consequence of the
general trend of increased reliance on courts in

was used as a dummy variable and, because
there were more suits, the intercept shifted significantly from 2000 to 2004 (z = 3.18).
Analysis of the data restricted to the battleground states also produced results consistent
with our conclusions. We categorized a state as
a battleground state if the final margin of victory was five points or less between the two
major party candidates. While daily internal
party polls would be the best source of determination for which states the parties considered to be battleground states, the final tally is
a reasonable surrogate for the expectation of
closeness. Moreover, little controversy exists as
to which states were indeed battleground states
for either 2000 or 2004 as there is a very close
match between the states identified by the final margin and those identified in earlier
polling (Cook 2004; Nagourney and Seeyle
2004).14 In Figure 3 (Battleground States), we
show the magnitude of change in litigation
rates for the eleven states we identified as battleground states. The bars represent the number of suits filed in each battleground state in
2004 in excess of the number of suits filed in
2000. Predictably, the states that were both closest and richest in electoral votes had the greatest magnitude of change in litigation rates.
Note that while Florida and Ohio had the greatest increases, the battleground states together
accounted for 72 of the 114 total lawsuits filed
in 2004.
The aggregate data suggest that the location
and substance of much litigation is driven by a
desire for electoral advantage when the elec- 14 For example, both the Cook Political Report 2004 and the
New York Times 10/24/2004 listed the same battleground
tion is perceived as close. Far more than in pre- states as used here (Cook 2004; Nagourney and Seelye
vious elections, courts are seen as a strategic 2004).
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election controversies (pildes 2004). In 2004,
however, that activity multiplied dramatically
in a similarly close election. This can be traced
to several possible causes. Doctrinally, the
Court's attempt to limit the scope of Bush v.
Gore to "the present circumstances" was only
partially successful as evidenced by the lawsuits in2004 that explicitly relied on the Court's
holding (Bush v. Gore 2000, 109).15
Beyond the doctrine, the courts signaled a
willingness to hear election related disputes
and, perhaps most importantly from the perspective of the judiciary, this intervention was
accepted by the public, including those who
disagreed with the outcome (Gibson, Caldeira,
and Spence 2003). The perceived likelihood of
the election results falling within the "margin
of litigation" was also undoubtedly higher in
2004. Few political commentators predicted
just how close the 2000 election would end up.
Few wanted to make the same mistake in 2004.
The possibility that preSidential elections can
be decided by relatively small changes in electoral rules or procedures is an acknowledged
reality today. Most importantly, parties, candidates, and interest groups now recognize just

how much can be lost by failing to engage in
preventive litigation. The entire outcome of the
2000 presidential election could have rested on
the court decisions in the following months.
Our evidence shows that the stakes are clear to
the relevant groups, especially the major political parties and their candidates. In contrast to
2000, the major political parties were more directly involved and this involvement likely legitimized further involvement by other litigants.
One question remains to be answered. How
might these changes affect future presidential
elections? The most obvious implication from
this research is that parties, interest groups, and
candidates now view the judiciary as a major
factor in campaign strategies so long as races
are close. As a result, litigation rates should remain at a higher level than they were in 2000
whenever the race is close. As the closeness of

15 See, for example, Bay County Democratic Party v. Land,
347 F. Supp. 2d 404 (E.D.Mich. 2004). That case challenged
ballot tabulation procedures in Michigan and relied explicitly on Bush v. Gore.
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the race diminishes, the rate of litigation should
also decrease, although we doubt it will return
to the levels of 1992 and 1996 in the foreseeable
future. It should be noted that this trend is not
limited to just presidential elections. The litigation surrounding both the recall election in
California in 2003 and the San Diego mayoral
and Washington gubernatorial races in 2004 fit
the same trend.
This judicialization of elections has profound
implications at both the state and federal level.
First, if federal courts continue to remain as active in election litigation as they were in 2004,
the stakes for the parties over federal judicial
appointments could increase. As the importance of the judiciary in resolving disputes over
electoral rules and procedures increases, the incentives for politicians to appoint loyal partisans to the bench will also increase. Such a development would likely lead to even greater
political conflict in judicial confirmations, since
the results could have a direct effect on the
races of members of Congress and presidents.
Thus, as elections become judicialized, the judiciary becomes increasingly politicized. At the
state level, where the judiciary is primarily
filled through gubernatorial appointments and
elections, the results would likely mirror the
contentiousness of the federal level, with increased rancor in elections and consideration
of partisan loyalties by appointing bodies.
Our research also implies a shift in responsibility away from electoral boards and secretaries of state and to the judiciary. There are at
least two potential positive outcomes from this
shift. The first is that the courts could act less
as partisans and more as "responsible" keepers of the law. The potential for partisan abuses
of authority by electoral boards and secretaries
of state abounds. Certainly in Florida, there
were many accusations of partisanship against
Republican Secretary of State Glenda Hood for
her intent to use the felony purge list despite
its many shortcomings. Courts, assuming they
are more removed from electoral pressures,
may serve as a more stable and reliable institution for resolving contentious political disputes. Secondly, as Tokaji argues, litigation offers the opportunity to clarify confusing
election legislation and regulations prior to
their implementation (Tokaji 2005, 1243-1244).
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It is better to resolve these disputes prior to

election day than to have extensive post-election battles, with the important caveat that the
cases be filed far enough in advance to actually
solve any identified problems in time. These
potential benefits may be mitigated, however,
by an increase in the politicization of the judiciary as discussed above. There also is some
reason for concern to the extent the running of
elections is taken away from those most knowledgeable about them and given instead to generalist judges. Finally, these developments suggest that the role of the parties in elections will
continue to increase as they coordinate the litigation efforts and resources across the electoral college landscape.
We can conclude that future closely contested states should show similar litigation
emerging throughout the year before any close
election. This development is consistent with
the literature on the conditions necessary for
the judicialization of elections. Additional research that illuminates the source of the funds
for litigation, the degree of coordination across
venues, and the expected overlap of the legal
elites across litigation forums may solidify our
conception of the scope and importance of the
judicialization of preSidential elections.
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